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In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payo implications of in-
troducing optimally-structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst
who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know
that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the prin-
cipal's expected benet from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the
agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made
robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.
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1 Introduction
Economists often emphasize the virtues of incentives across settings from regulation and pro-
curement to worker and executive compensation. Nonetheless, moves to introduce explicit
incentives are often criticized for leaving large rents to agents. This is particularly true when
the principal in the relationship appears to gain little from oering incentives. To give an
example, reforms in the UK in the 1980s led public utilities to be privatized and subjected
to regulation, part of an eort to harness the eciency advantages of nancial incentives.
Later, the Blair government introduced the Windfall Tax on utility companies, a response
to negative public sentiment surrounding the earlier reforms. The negative sentiment was fed
by both the magnitude of corporate prots and a perception that the public (or more directly,
the government as principal) had failed to benet from the changes.1
Economic theory oers a possible lens through which to examine the distribution of welfare
that results from the introduction of incentives. Yet, putting incentive theory to work,
say to make predictions on welfare implications, is dicult. In particular, determining the
fundamentals of the economic environment is often challenging. It is therefore natural to
ask what predictions are possible when details of the economic environment are not well
understood.
This paper is concerned with the predictions available when ambiguity concerning the
environment persists due to a lack of experience with incentives. We consider a canonical
single-agent procurement framework where incentive contracts are to be newly introduced.
We then determine the predictions available to an analyst who is ignorant regarding the
agent's preferences (equivalently, technology) for responding to incentives. We suppose the
analyst does, however, correctly anticipate the contracting model, and that the principal will
choose the incentive contract to minimize expected payments given knowledge of the agent's
preferences. That is, while the principal solves a well-known procurement model, the analyst
is tasked with predicting outcomes in the absence of a key primitive.
Apart from regularity conditions on the agent's preferences, our analyst will have no way
of determining the agent's willingness to respond to incentives. The agent might be highly
responsive to any incentives oered, or not responsive at all. For this reason, the analyst has no
hope of making informative predictions on the absolute level of the agent's performance, or on
the gains to the principal of incentive contracting (say relative to an alternative regime where
no incentives are oered). However, it will turn out that statements on relative payos of the
players are possible. Our main contribution is to obtain a lower bound on the principal's gains
from incentives given possible values of the agent's rents. This bound is negligible conditional
1See Chennells (1997) for a discussion.
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on the agent earning negligible rent in an optimal incentive contract, but it increases with
the agent's rents. Consider then a policy maker or other interested party who has the same
information as the analyst and is concerned at the possibility of large agent rents under an
optimal contract. For instance, in public procurement where the agent is a private contractor,
the concern may be about enriching wealthy shareholders and exacerbating inequality. The
analyst can oer the prediction that, if the agent's preferences (or technology) turn out to be
such that he can expect high rents, then the expected gains from incentive contracting will
lie above a known bound. Depending on the value of the bound, such a prediction might oer
some reassurance.
Details of the setting. We specialize in this paper to a procurement model where the
principal obtains a xed number of units from the agent. Realized production costs are public,
so payments to the agent can be conditioned on them; i.e., the setting is one of cost-based
procurement. The cost of supplying these units without eort  often termed the agent's
innate cost  is the agent's private information. The agent can privately choose eort to
reduce the publicly observed production cost below his innate cost. The agent's preferences for
cost-reducing eort are characterized by a disutility of eort function, taken to be increasing,
convex, and independent of the innate cost. The principal, having a prior on the innate costs
and knowing the disutility function, oers an optimal contract. Optimal contracts can be
determined using a mechanism design approach, as in Laont and Tirole (1986).
As noted, the analyst's problem is to determine welfare predictions for optimal contracts.
These predictions are made knowing that the above model of cost-based procurement applies,
and given the prior on innate costs, but without knowledge of the agent's disutility function.
Availability of a prior on innate costs is in line with the analyst having observations on past
cost performance under cost-plus contracting. Since cost-plus contracts pay the agent only
the observed production cost, these contracts provide no incentives for eort, and so induce
a production cost equal to the innate cost. One interpretation of the analyst's problem is
that she is tasked with informing a policy decision to introduce incentive contracts given a
history of cost-plus contracting. While the analyst is ignorant of the disutility function, she
anticipates the information will become available to the principal if a decision to implement
incentive contracting proceeds (say, because implementation is accompanied by further study
of the agent's technology, or by the hiring of external expertise).
Main results. Our main results characterize the expected payos from optimal incentive
contracting, across all permitted agent preferences for cost-reducing eort. A range of values
for expected agent rents is possible in an optimal contract, depending on the disutility function.
We nd a lower bound on the principal's gains from incentives for each level of agent rents that
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is not only increasing with agent rents (as mentioned above), but is also convex. Convexity
provides a stronger sense in which the principal's relative guarantee improves with the welfare
of the agent.
We then investigate how the relative guarantee on the principal's expected gains from
incentives depends on the distribution of innate costs. When the innate cost is uniformly
distributed, the guarantee is exactly the size of agent expected rents. In other words, the
principal is guaranteed at least half the eciency gains from incentive contracting. More
generally, we provide sucient conditions on the distribution of innate costs for the guarantee
to be greater than one half, and conditions for the guarantee to be less (i.e., for the principal
to obtain less than half of the eciency gains for some realization of agent preferences).
The focus on the possibility of a 50/50 split of surplus is not only analytically convenient,
but may be relevant for assessing fairness considerations surrounding the introduction of
incentives. For instance, as discussed by Lopomo and Ok (2001, p 263), a regularity in
laboratory experiments where one party holds a clear strategic advantage (such as ultimatum
games) is surplus division around the 50/50 split, presumably because subjects consider such
a split as fair. A guarantee that the principal will obtain at least half the surplus from the
introduction of incentives is in this sense a guarantee that the expected outcome of contracting
will not be unfair on the principal (or in public procurement settings, on the general public
on whose behalf the principal might be presumed to act).
Analytical approach. In terms of our analytical approach, the main novelty lies in
the problem of mapping the innate cost distribution to a tight or sharp lower bound
for the principal's gains from incentives, as a function of agent rents.2 This takes place in
the following steps. Following a characterization of mechanisms that solve the principal's
problem, we determine an expression for the principal's expected gains from incentives that
depends on the agent's marginal disutility of eort at each value of the innate cost. A key
property of any optimal mechanism for the principal is that the agent's eort is monotone
decreasing in the innate cost. Given convexity of the disutility function, this property holds
also for the agent's marginal disutility of eort. Since the agent's expected rents are also
determined by the marginal disutility of eort, a lower bound for the principal's expected
gains given agent rents is obtained by minimizing over the agent's marginal disutility of eort
subject to a constraint determined by the agent's rents, and subject to the aforementioned
monotonicity. While optimization subject to monotonicity constraints has often presented
analytical challenges (see Hellwig, 2008, for a discussion), it turns out to be tractably solved
in our case by reference to a convexication argument explained below. The solution to the
2The terms tight and sharp are applied variously to bounds that cannot be improved on.
3
minimization problem provides a lower bound on the principal's gains from incentives. The
remaining step establishes tightness. This involves exhibiting disutility functions for which
the principal's payo is equal to, or at least arbitrarily close to, the aforementioned bound.
Relationship to empirical literature on procurement. Our results connecting the
shape of the innate cost distribution to the relative welfare of the players may be helpful for
understanding existing empirical work on procurement. For instance, we argue (in Section 5)
that eciency gains guaranteed for the principal tend to be larger when the agent's innate
costs are more concentrated at lower values. This seems to be the prevalent case in the
empirical literature, where there is often a long tail of rms with high costs.
The fact that the shape of the innate cost distribution plays a critical role in determining
the possible welfare implications of incentive contracting is in fact anticipated by empirical
work. A case in point is Abito (2019), who uses a version of Laont and Tirole's (1986) model
in his study of electric utilities, and where each rm's innate cost eciency is determined
by its type. He explains that his counterfactual predictions turn on the shape of the type
distribution:
The shape of the type distribution is an important determinant in the design
of the optimal mechanism and the welfare gains it delivers. The gains from the
optimal mechanism are not simply about getting all rms to exert more eort, but
rather more about eectively mitigating the cost of the regulator's informational
disadvantage. The cost of the informational disadvantage is determined by the
shape of the type distribution which therefore importantly aects the measure
of welfare gains. Thus, as in most studies on asymmetric information, the key
challenge is to estimate this distribution.
The results in the present paper could turn out to be useful in such empirical settings, because
they provide a way to make relevant predictions without data to inform agent preferences for
eort, and without parametric functional form restrictions. The usual approach in empirical
work using the Laont and Tirole framework (such as in Abito's paper, but also in other
important contributions such as Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2002) has been to estimate disutil-
ity functions with a given parametric form.3 Estimation of disutility functions is based on
additional data on rms' response to incentives; that is, beyond the data on rms' innate
costs.4
3It is worth noting that related questions arise in settings outside procurement. For instance, Lazear (2000)
studies empirically the eects of a transition from low-powered xed-wage contracts to piece-rate incentive
schemes.
4For instance Abito uses rm performance in between regulatory rate cases, when incentives for cost
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Layout. The layout of the paper is as follows. The rest of this section discusses further
related literature. Section 2 then introduces the cost-based procurement model, and Section
3 provides an analysis of optimal contracting in this model. Section 4 derives our character-
ization of expected welfare under optimal contracts. Section 5 shows how the set of feasible
expected payos depends on the distribution of innate costs. Section 6 concludes. Formal
proofs not included in the main text are in the Appendix.
Further related literature. At a conceptual level, the value in obtaining robust pre-
dictions on welfare in our environment is related to a broader interest in the theory literature
for obtaining robust predictions on economic variables. Notably, work such as Bergemann and
Morris (2013, 2016) and Bergemann, Brooks and Morris (2015, 2017) explore the predictions
that can be made by an outside observer to an interaction, given information on certain fun-
damentals, but lacking other pertinent details. The pertinent details in these papers relate to
the information structure  players' information on the payo-relevant state or payo types,
and where relevant their higher-order beliefs.5 An important part of their motivation is that,
in many settings, the information structure will generally be very hard [for an outsider] to
observe, as it is in the agents' minds and does not necessarily have an observable counterpart
(Bergemann and Morris, 2013, p 1252). Our motivation is similar, although the economic ob-
jects are dierent. Our interest is in contracting settings where certain information, especially
the distribution of innate costs, may be readily observed (or at least inferred from data); at
the same time other information, especially regarding the agent's preferences for eort, is not.
Our work is also connected to the developing literature on robust incentive contracts, in
that our focus is on the lower bound of the principal's performance across possible realizations
of ambiguous preferences. The robust contracting literature takes a worst-case perspective
to evaluating incentive contracts (in terms of levels, or regret-type criteria) and includes work
such as Hurwicz and Shapiro (1978), Chassang (2013), Garrett (2014), Carroll (2015), and
Dai and Toikka (2017). If we view adversarial Nature as choosing the agent's preferences
or technology, then the main dierence between this literature and the present paper is the
timing of Nature's move. In this paper, Nature moves before the principal determines an
optimal contract, whereas in the robust contracting literature, Nature's move comes after.
There is some similarity in proof approach to the paper by Garrett, who considers a similar
procurement model but for a principal who is ignorant of the agent's disutility function.
reduction are strongest. Gagnepain and Ivaldi use the performance of those rms subject to high-powered
xed-price contracts.
5Interest in making robust predictions is clearly more widespread in the theory literature. An example
is Segal and Whinston (2003), who determine predictions on outcomes that hold across a broad class of
contracting games with a single principal and many agents.
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The main similarity is the need to construct adversarial disutility functions (i.e., disutility
functions chosen so that the principal obtains a low payo).
Another connection to the robust contracting literature is the observation that high payos
for the agent can imply a good outcome for the principal. This idea is exploited in the analysis
of linear contracts by Chassang (2013) and Carroll (2015), where linear contracts turn out
to guarantee the principal a payo that is proportional to the agent's rents. The present
analysis also shows that a high value of expected agent rents can imply a high guarantee on
the principal's expected gains from incentive contracting. This guarantee is obtained under
the hypothesis of optimal contracting by the principal, rather than given an arbitrary linear
incentive scheme.
A nal strand of literature to be mentioned is econometric analyses of incentive design
in regulation and procurement. For instance, Perrigne and Vuong (2011) show how one can
identify (in their case, nonparametrically) structural parameters of the Laont and Tirole
(1986) model using data on observables such as realized demand, realized cost, and payments
to the agent. A connection to the present work is the objective of drawing implications from a
combination of weak assumptions on model primitives together with the hypothesis of optimal
contracting.
2 The model
The procurement model. We introduce our ideas in a standard procurement framework
that is a simplied version of Laont and Tirole (1986, 1993; henceforth, LT). The model we
consider has been popular in the literature, see for instance Rogerson (2003) and Chu and
Sappington (2007).
The principal is responsible for procuring a xed quantity of a good from an agent who is
the supplier. We normalize the quantity to a single unit. The principal aims to procure this
unit while minimizing total payments to the agent.
The agent is associated with an innate cost β (that we sometimes refer to as his type),
and a cost-reduction technology. The latter is characterized by a disutility function
ψ : R→ R+. If the agent exerts eort e to reduce costs, then he incurs a private disu-
tility ψ (e). This disutility could represent the inconvenience of putting in place measures to
lower costs, or could represent physical costs incurred by the agent that are not direct costs
accounted for in the contract. After eort e, the realized production cost is C = β − e ∈ R.
While the principal knows the function ψ and observes the realized production cost C, both
the innate cost β and the eort e are the agent's private information.
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The environment permits transfers between the principal and agent. Following LT, we
adopt the accounting convention that the realized production cost C is paid by the principal.
In addition, the agent receives a transfer y. Payos are quasi-linear in money, so that the
agent's Bernoulli utility (in case of eort e and transfer y) is y − ψ (e). In case the agent
refuses the contract, he does not produce and earns payo zero. Procurement of the unit
is taken to be essential for the principal. Subject to the constraint of ensuring the unit is
supplied, the principal's objective is then to minimize the expectation of total expenditure
y + C.
The disutility function ψ satises the following requirements. It is taken to be non-
decreasing and convex; with ψ strictly increasing on R+ and constant at zero on R−. We
take ψ to be Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant strictly greater than one. We then
let Ψ be the set of all disutility functions ψ satisfying these conditions.
That the agent incurs positive disutility from positive eort ensures that the innate cost
β has the intended interpretation  the agent chooses zero eort when incentives are ab-
sent. We assume the agent can costlessly inate the production cost above the innate cost by
choosing negative eort, although this will not occur in equilibrium. The possibility for the
agent to inate the production cost above his innate cost ensures that every type can attain
the production cost prescribed for every other type. This in turn readily permits a character-
ization of incentive compatibility through application of a certain envelope theorem (that of
Carbajal and Ely, 2013, as described below).6 Monotonicity and convexity of ψ are standard
shape restrictions. It is natural to expect that higher eort is more costly (monotonicity),
and oftentimes additionally that there are diminishing returns to cost reductions (convexity).
Diminishing returns would also imply a Lipschitz constant greater than one. This is a kind
of Inada condition that guarantees ecient eort is bounded, and which plays a role in the
existence of optimal mechanisms. Lipschitz continuity is a technical condition, which, given
convexity of ψ, is a restriction on this function only at large values of eort e that will not be
chosen in equilibrium. It is again helpful for permitting application of the envelope theorem.
Note in addition that the agent's preferences for eort are independent of the innate cost
(i.e., ψ does not depend on β). While this assumption has been common in the procurement
literature, its applicability would depend on the circumstances at hand. For instance, inde-
pendence describes well a scenario where the agent's private information on β relates to the
cost of obtaining a xed input to production, where the quantity of this input does not depend
on the amount of eort exerted.7
6See Garrett and Pavan (2012) who also permit such cost ination to facilitate application of an envelope
theorem in an LT-type model.
7Note that our analysis will still be informative about the set of expected payos for broader classes of
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The agent's innate cost β is drawn from a cdf F that is twice continuously dierentiable,





seems natural to require β > 0. Finally, throughout we assume that F (β) /f (β) is strictly
increasing (equivalently, F is strictly log concave) and Lipschitz continuous, denoting its rst
derivative by h (β).
Since our view is that the analyst knows the distribution of innate costs F , the above
assumptions can at least be veried on a case-by-case basis. Log concavity of F has been a
common restriction in the literature.
The timing of the game is then the same as in LT. First, the agent learns his private
type β, drawn from F . Then the principal oers a mechanism, which prescribes payments
to the agent as a function of any messages sent by the agent and the realized cost, which is
observable and contractible. Next, the agent determines whether to accept the mechanism.
If he does not, the agent earns payo zero. If he does accept, then he sends a message to the
principal, and then makes his eort choice. The production cost is realized, and the principal
makes a payment to the agent as prescribed by the mechanism.
Without loss of generality, we can consider incentive-compatible and individually-rational
direct mechanisms. The agent makes a report of his type β̂ to the mechanism. The mechanism




. If the agent reports his innate cost β
truthfully, then meeting the cost target requires eort e (β) = β −C (β), which can therefore
be understood as the eort recommendation of the mechanism for type β. If the agent achieves













to the agent is negative. Since the mechanism is individually rational, a choice to report β̂




is never optimal for the agent. This observation is enough to
transform the principal's problem from one of both moral hazard and adverse selection into
one of only adverse selection.
Objective of the analysis. The aim of our analysis is to understand the payo im-
plications of introducing incentive contracts. As discussed in the Introduction, we consider
an analyst who understands that the cost-based procurement model above is the correct de-
scription of the environment, and has a reliable prior belief F regarding the innate cost β.
However, she does not know the agent's preferences for eort, only that they are described by
a function in Ψ. She does know that the principal, who eventually designs and implements
preferences, since the payo set for these broader preferences must nest the one that we characterize below
(for instance, when the principal is guaranteed only a small fraction of the expected surplus under the imposed
restrictions on preferences, the guarantee can only be smaller for more admissive restrictions). For a more
precise characterization, one would need to adapt the steps in our analysis for the broader preferences (which
may be more or less tractable depending on the restrictions in question).
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an incentive contract to minimize the expected total payment to the agent, has the same dis-
tribution F in mind for the innate cost, will know the disutility function ψ precisely, and will
choose mechanisms optimally. We ask, what expected payo implications does the analyst
consider possible?
3 Preliminaries
Analysis of the principal's contracting problem. We begin by extending analysis fa-
miliar from LT to the present environment. The main point of dierence is that we are more
permissive in the restrictions on ψ; for instance, we do not require ψ to be dierentiable. Fix
the mechanism oered by the principal (as described above). Note that, if the agent makes a




. By the observation
regarding individual rationality of the mechanism in the previous section, we may presume












Let ∂−ψ denote the left derivative of ψ. We argue (see Section A.1 in the Appendix) that
we can consider mechanisms where the agent's rents are given, as a function of his true innate
cost β, by ∫ β̄
β
[∂−ψ] (e (x)) dx. (1)
This follows from incentive compatibility of the mechanism, after applying the envelope result
of Carbajal and Ely (2013) for non-dierentiable objective functions, and from considering
mechanisms that maximize the principal's expected payo for a given eort policy e (·).8











The principal's expected total payment in a mechanism that optimally implements an eort
8Note that one might be tempted to believe that precisely the same analysis as usually performed when
ψ is dierentiable should carry through, given that a convex disutility function ψ is dierentiable except at
countably many points. The diculty, however, is that eort is endogenous, since it is chosen by the principal,
and hence may be chosen at kinks in the disutility with positive probability (in spite of the continuous
distribution of innate costs). As Carbajal and Ely point out, this necessitates alternative arguments.
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policy e (·) is
E
[










V G (e, β) = e− ψ (e)− F (β)
f (β)
[∂−ψ] (e) (4)
(we leave the dependence of V G on ψ and F implicit). Here, V G (e, β) is the virtual gain
from incentives inducing eort e for innate cost β, comprising eciency gains e− ψ (e) from
eort less a term accounting for agent rents.
Considering minimization of (3) by choice of the eort policy, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.1. Any eort policy e∗ (·) for an optimal mechanism solves, for almost all
innate costs β,
W (β) = max
e
V G (e, β) .
Optimal eort policies e∗ (·) are essentially unique and non-increasing. Also, [∂−ψ] (e∗ (β)) < 1
for almost all β.9
The result shows that there is an optimal eort policy that maximizes virtual gains from
incentives pointwise; also, the optimal policy is essentially unique (in what follows, we restrict
attention to versions of the optimal policy e∗ (β) that maximize virtual gains at all values of
β, not merely almost all). In other words, the rst-order or relaxed program approach to
solving the design problem is established to be valid. While such a result is readily antici-
pated from earlier work (including LT), it is obtained under weaker conditions than usually
assumed. Because the rst-order approach is valid, no additional restrictions on the shape of
ψ are needed to justify restriction to deterministic eort policies (see Strausz, 2006, for this
observation in a related model).
The properties obtained for optimal eort e∗ (·) follow from examining the virtual gains




< 1 at an
ecient eort level eFB if there is a kink in ψ at eFB; hence, unlike the case for dierentiable
disutility functions, an optimal mechanism may specify ecient eort for a positive measure
of innate costs). Downward distortions in eort are due to the familiar reason that they
reduce the rents the agent can expect in an incentive-compatible and individually-rational
mechanism. Distortions are larger for higher values of β, which can be understood in part
from examining the expression for agent rents in Equation (1): in particular, the agent's
rents for a given innate cost depends on the eort induced from all higher innate costs. It is
9Note that the analysis here assumes the agent resolves indierences over reports by reporting truthfully.
This is the usual approach in the literature.
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worth emphasizing here that monotonicity of eort therefore comes from optimization of the
virtual gains in Equation (4) given log concavity of F . The condition for an eort policy to
be implementable in an incentive-compatible mechanism is weaker, since all that is required
is that C (β) = β − e (β) is non-decreasing with β (see the discussion immediately preceding
Lemma A.2 in the Appendix).
Quadratic disutility. To shed further light on the properties of an optimal mechanism,
it is useful to consider the case of quadratic disutility, which often receives attention in the
literature. To be precise, given the restrictions in the model set-up, consider functions satisfy-
ing ψ (e) = ke2/2 on an interval [0, ē], with ē > 1/k and k > 0 (such functions can be chosen
in Ψ for any k > 0). Optimal eort then satises, for all β,
e∗ (β) = max {0, 1/k − F (β) /f (β)} .
It is then easy to see that the expected rents in Equation (2) vary continuously with k. As k
grows large, optimal eort equals zero with a probability approaching one. Hence, expected
rents shrink to zero as k → ∞. Conversely, as k is taken to zero, optimal eort is large and
positive uniformly across types β (since F/f is bounded), and the agent's marginal disutility




F (β) dβ, (5)
which by Proposition 3.1 is an upper bound on rents that holds across all disutility functions
in Ψ, given the distribution F . We can conclude that expected rents can take any value in(
0, R̄
)
for some value of k.
Dening the analyst's problem. We now dene the objects of interest for the analyst:
the principal's expected gains from incentives and agent expected rents under an optimal
mechanism. Given a cdf F for innate costs, for any ψ ∈ Ψ, the principal implements an
optimal mechanism with essentially unique eort e∗ (·). Agent expected rents in the optimal
mechanism are given by Equation (2), evaluated at the optimal eort policy. We denote these
expected rents by R (ψ;F ). On the other hand, the principal's expected gains from incentives
are







Our interest will be in characterizing, for each F , the set
U ≡
{





Further preliminary observations on the analyst's problem. Recalling Proposition
3.1 and the discussion in the previous section, the set of possible agent rents is [0, R̄) with R̄




are obtained by the quadratic disutility
functions considered in the previous section. Expected rents equal to R̄ cannot occur, due to
the nal claim in Proposition 3.1. Given that ∂−ψ is strictly positive at positive eort values,
the agent's expected rents are zero if and only if optimal eort is constant (almost surely) at
zero. This occurs if the right derivative of ψ is above one at zero (i.e., [∂+ψ] (0) ≥ 1). Clearly,
in this case, the principal's expected gains from incentives are zero.
Given these observations, our interest is to determine the expected gains from incentives
when the expected agent rents R are in (0, R̄). We will characterize the function
Ginf (R) ≡ inf
ψ∈Ψ
{G (ψ;F ) : ψ ∈ Ψ, R (ψ;F ) = R}
on [0, R̄). This function denes the lower boundary of the set U . We will show by Proposi-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 below that it is strictly increasing and weakly convex (properties that were
emphasized in the Introduction).
Finally, note that while, for each level of agent expected rent R ∈ (0, R̄), Ginf (R) denes
the inmum of expected gains from incentives, arbitrarily higher gains from incentives can
occur depending on the disutility function. We formalize this in Corollary 4.1 below. The
argument is based on the following idea. For a disutility function ψ ∈ Ψ associated with a
point close to the boundary of U , we can consider another disutility function of the form
ψ̄ (e; a, ε) =

0 if e ≤ 0
εe if e ∈ (0, a],
εa+ ψ (e− a) if e > a
(6)
for ε, a > 0. These parameters can be chosen so that expected gains from incentives under an
optimal mechanism take values above G (ψ;F ), while expected rents are close to R (ψ;F ).10
The idea behind considering disutility functions of this form is that the agent is permitted to
achieve cost reduction a almost for free when ε is small, implying an increase in the surplus that
can be generated from incentives. For such a disutility function with small enough ε, optimal
eort is at least a for all innate costs. Also, for an innate cost β assigned eort e∗ (β) > 0
10For the disutility functions ψ that we show are close to the boundary of U , the modied disutility ψ̄ (·; a, ε)
remains convex and hence in Ψ provided ε is small enough.
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in an optimal mechanism for ψ, optimal eort can be set to e∗ (β) + a in a mechanism that
is optimal for ψ̄ (·; a, ε). It follows that expected surplus increases by at least a (1− ε) in a
mechanism optimal for ψ̄ (·; a, ε), while any additional expected rents vanish as ε→ 0. Thus,
once we have determined disutility functions associated with points at or arbitrarily close
to the boundary of U , it is possible to modify these functions to attain points with higher
expected gains from incentives.
Main arguments. A key step in determining Ginf (R) (given the innate cost distribution
F ) is to recognize that the virtual gains from incentives can be represented by an envelope
formula. Given F and ψ, the virtual gains are W (β) = maxe V G (e, β) (where recall V G
is dened in Equation (4)). Because ψ is Lipschitz, and because F/f is dierentiable and
Lipschitz, the conditions for the envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002) are satised.
We can conclude that







h (s) [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (s)) ds,










is non-negative, and may be strictly positive
depending on the disutility function. Also,W (·) is non-increasing. This can be understood by
observing that the term that accounts for rents in Equation (4), i.e. − (F (β) /f (β)) [∂−ψ] (e),
is non-increasing in β for any eort e (as F/f is strictly increasing). Put simply, the virtual
gains are larger for lower innate costs because the expected rent the principal must give to
the agent as a result of raising the eorts for these innate costs is smaller (recall that, by
Equation (1), the rents earned for an agent with innate cost β are determined by the eort
asked for all higher innate costs).
We can now nd a convenient expression for the expected gains from incentives for the
principal. We have


















) h(β̃) [∂−ψ](e∗ (β̃))
 (7)
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. One way to think about the
second term in Equation (7) is to note that a reduction in β increases the term in Equation
(4) that accounts for agent rents (− (F (β) /f (β)) [∂−ψ] (e)). The marginal eect, given an
optimal eort policy, is h (β) [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β)). This eect can be viewed as cumulative; the
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marginal eect accrues to all lower innate costs, which have probability F (β), and this is
weighted in the expectation by the density f (β) for type β.
The rest of our argument consists of two main steps. To obtain a lower bound on the
principal's gains from incentives given agent expected rents R, we set the principal's virtual
gains from incentives for type β̄ (that is, W (β̄)) equal to its minimum possible value, zero. We
then consider minimizing the second term of Equation (7) by choice of the marginal disutility
of eort function [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (·)), subject to the agent's expected rents in Equation (2) being
equal to R. This is the rst step. We know from Proposition 3.1 that the marginal disutility
of eort can be assumed non-increasing in type, so we impose this monotonicity constraint
in the optimization. While the constrained minimization problem delivers a lower bound
on the principal's expected gains from incentives given agent expected rents R, determining
that this bound is tight requires demonstrating that there exists a disutility function in Ψ
such that the principal's expected gains from incentives coincide with the bound, or at least
can be taken arbitrarily close. The feasibility of this second step (i.e., the tightness of the
bound determined in step one) does not seem a priori obvious. It involves reverse engineering
admissible disutilities ψ such that the marginal disutility of eort function [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (·)) is
equal, or arbitrarily close to, the one determined in the optimization problem of the rst step.




, must be equal (or
taken arbitrarily close) to zero.
We now state the minimization problem of the rst step, where we determine our lower
bound L∗ (R) as a function of agent rents R.




→ [0, 1] such that γ is non-increasing.












F (β)h (β) γ (β) dβ. (8)




F (β) γ (β) dβ,
∫ β̄
β
F (β)h (β) γ (β) dβ
)
.
For an interpretation of P , suppose there is a disutility function such that γ (β) is the agent's
marginal disutility of eort for each type β in an optimal mechanism. Suppose also that




= 0). Then the rst
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component of P (γ) is the agent's ex-ante expected rent, while the second component is the
principal's expected gains from optimal incentives. Then function L∗ (·) can then be obtained
from the lower boundary of the set
{P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ} .
As a basis for functions in Γ, we consider step functions
γx (β) =





. We show (see Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 4.1 in the Appendix) that
{P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ} is equal to the convex hull of
{









is a closed curve (see further explanation following Proposition 4.1),
the convex hull is also closed.




is a point on the lower boundary of this convex hull.
It is then immediate that L∗ (·) is strictly increasing (since h is strictly positive) and weakly





is a convex combination of points P (γx) for at most two values of x. Hence (by
linearity of P ) there is a solution to Problem I that can be written as a convex combination
of step functions γx for two values of x. To summarize, we have the following result.








→ [0, 1] to the minimization in





, there is a solution described by two cut-os βl and βu, with β ≤ βl ≤ βu ≤ β̄.




, γ∗ (β) is constant and strictly between zero and one on
[βl, βu), and γ





To understand better Proposition 4.1, consider the curve
{





parametrically dened through the thresholds x of the step functions γx and dened in the
space of players' welfare. To dene this curve explicitly as a function of the agent's rents






11The convex hull of the set
{










F (s)h (s) ds
so that {











To give an interpretation to p (R), it is the expected gains for the principal when the agent has
expected rent R, when the agent's marginal disutility of eort is given by a step function and





Using the implicit function theorem, x′ (R) = 1/F (x (R)) for all R. Therefore, p′ (R) =
h (x (R)). Since x (·) is an increasing function, p (·) is convex when h is increasing (i.e., when
F/f is strictly convex) and concave when h is decreasing (i.e., when F/f is strictly concave).12
Now consider the value of the minimization problem. If h is increasing, then L∗ (R) = p (R)




, since the lower boundary of the aforementioned convex hull is given by
the curve p (·) itself. That is, the fact L∗ (R) = p (R) follows because, when F/f is convex,
the solution to Problem I is a step function given by γx(R) for each value of expected rents R.
An example of this case is displayed in Figure 1. The thresholds in Proposition 4.1 are then
βl = βu = x (R). If h is decreasing, then points on the lower boundary of the convex hull are






. An example of this case is displayed in Figure





















. The thresholds in the proposition are βl = β and
βu = β̄. Finally, note that cases where F/f is neither convex nor concave can also be handled
by considering points on the lower boundary of the convex hull of
{






12If F is thrice dierentiable, we have that F/f strictly convex over [β, β̄] if, for all β,






2 − f ′′ (β) f (β)
)
while F/f is strictly concave when the reverse inequality holds. Mierendor (2016) discusses the convex-
ity/concavity of (1− F ) /f and gives an analogous condition.
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Figure 1: Example with F/f convex
Example with β distributed with density f (β) = 5/2− β on [1, 2]. Hence, F/f is strictly
increasing and strictly convex. The black curve is the function p (·). The blue area is its
convex hull. The black circle is at (R, p (R)) = (0.167, 0.224) = P (γ1.5); i.e. the point
attained by the step function γx with threshold x = 1.5.
Figure 2: Example with F/f concave
Example with β from a shifted truncated standard normal distribution, with truncation to
[−3,−2] (ndings are independent of the shift parameter). Then, F/f is strictly increasing
and strictly concave. The black curve is p (·). The blue area is its convex hull, and its lower














= (0.316, 0.081). The black circle is the
point (R,L∗ (R)) = (0.044, 0.011) (chosen so that R =
∫ x
β
F (s) ds, with x the midpoint of
the support).
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We now show that the lower bound on gains from incentives given by L∗ is tight, and
hence coincides with the function Ginf .





For any ε > 0, there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that
R (ψ;F ) = R
and
G (ψ;F ) < L∗ (R) + ε.
Hence, Ginf (R) = L∗ (R).
The proof of Proposition 4.2 involves nding disutility functions ψ ∈ Ψ such that the left
derivative of disutility at optimal eort levels, i.e. [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (·)), approaches a xed solution γ∗
to Problem I (as mentioned in the outline of our approach above). To illustrate the nature of
the argument, we consider in the main text the apparently simplest case where the thresholds
in Proposition 4.1 satisfy β = βl < βu ≤ β̄, which occurs for instance if F/f is concave (in
this case, recall that βu = β̄). The corresponding solution to Problem I, γ




F (s) ds ∈ (0, 1) on the interval [β, βu).
We aim to nd a disutility function ψ ∈ Ψ such that, at an optimal eort policy e∗ (·), (a)
the left derivative of disutility of eort [∂−ψ] (e




for innate costs β below βu, and is zero (with zero eort exerted) for higher innate costs,
and (b) virtual gains from incentives V G (e∗ (β) , β) are equal to zero for β = βu. For such
a disutility function, the agent must obtain expected rents R, and the principal's expected
gains from incentives must equal L∗ (R).13








13Conditions (a) and (b) are not only sucient for this to be true, but will also be necessary provided that
the solution γ∗ to Problem I is essentially unique (e.g., if F/f is strictly concave). This can be seen from
Equations (7) and (8) above.
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and k > 1, and put
ψ (e) =

0 if e ≤ 0
R∫ βu
β F (s)ds
e if 0 < e ≤ b
Rb∫ βu
β F (s)ds
+ k (e− b) if e > b
.




, and e∗ (β) =
0 for β above βu, if any. This shows that the inmum of expected gains from incentives
(conditional on expected rents R) is attained.
Apart from illustrating the nature of the argument to obtain Proposition 4.2, the above
derivation illustrates the kinds of disutility functions for which the principal obtains a low
share of the surplus from incentive contracting. For instance, note that when F/f is strictly
concave, the solution γ∗ to Problem I is essentially unique (see footnote 13). Then, points on
the lower boundary of the expected payos are obtained only by disutility functions of the
above form, with disutility of eort linear up to some value. The form of disutility functions
that attain or approach the boundary may be of interest in case some disutility functions
are considered more plausible than others. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the bound
obtained in Proposition 4.1 continues to hold if we admit disutility functions only from some
strict subset of Ψ (naturally, in this case, the bound may no longer be tight).
It may be of interest to observe that the optimal mechanism corresponding to the above
disutility function is arguably rather simple. This mechanism has an indirect implementation
where the agent simply produces at cost C (without making any report of type) and receives
payment
y = max




in addition to reimbursement of the production cost C. This can be viewed as a menu
comprising a cost-reimbursement contract (i.e., y = 0 for all production costs), and a linear
cost-sharing rule where the agent gets R/
∫ βu
β
F (s) ds per unit of cost savings. See Chu and
Sappington (2007) for an analysis of the performance of such menus more generally. Because
the agent's marginal disutility of eort is R/
∫ βu
β
F (s) ds up to eort b, the agent is indierent
across eorts in [0, b] under the linear cost-sharing rule. The agent puts no eort and earns
payo zero under the cost-reimbursement contract. It is then immediate that the agent prefers
the linear cost-sharing rule if and only if β ≤ βu. Since in this case the agent is willing to
choose eort equal to b, the eort policy e∗ (β) described above is optimal for the agent, and
this mechanism is optimal for the principal assuming the agent chooses eort according to
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e∗ (β).
Let us conclude this section by considering expected gains from incentives above the lower
boundary Ginf . The following can be established using disutility functions of the form intro-
duced in Equation (6).





any G > Ginf (R), and any ε > 0, there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that |G (ψ;F ) − G| < ε and
|R (ψ;F )−R| < ε.
As discussed above, the result is useful as it indicates the relevant characterization of
possible values of expected welfare reduces to a characterization of the lower bound Ginf .
5 Properties of the payo region
We now consider how the principal's guaranteed gains from incentives depend on the shape of
the innate cost distribution. First note that, when F is any uniform distribution, h is constant
and equal to one (since F (β) /f (β) = β − β), and so Ginf (R) = R for all R ∈ (0, R̄). In
other words, when the expected surplus from incentive contracting is not too large (precisely,
when it is below 2R̄), the smallest share of this surplus that the principal may earn is one
half. This observation itself could be of interest for applications, as several papers have drawn
conclusions based on uniformly distributed innate costs (see, for instance, Gasmi, Laont and
Sharkey, 1997, and Rogerson, 2003). Building on the observation for uniform distributions,
we show the following.
Corollary 5.1. Fix a distribution F , then:14








/2, then Ginf (R) ≤ R for all R ∈ (0, R̄); the

















/2 for all β ∈ (β, β̄], then Ginf (R) ≥ R







/2 for all β ∈ (β, β̄].





/2 is sucient to conclude Ginf (R) ≤ R. The condition is a sense
14Note that both cases can occur. Case 1 applies to the distribution considered in Figure 2, while Case 2
applies to the distribution considered in Figure 1.
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in which the distribution is negatively skewed. The reason for the result is related to the
observation that, when innate costs are concentrated at higher values, the principal's optimal
policy, for a xed disutility function, calls for relatively small distortions for high innate costs.
In particular, the principal's policy calls for positive eort, even when the surplus generated
from this eort is relatively small. In turn, this permits the agent to earn high expected rents
even for disutility functions that permit only relatively small increases in surplus through
cost-reducing eort. That the agent obtains high rents when the principal species positive
eort at high innate costs follows from considering the expression for rents in Equation (1).
Intuition for Part 2 is then the reverse. When innate costs are more concentrated at lower
values, the optimal eort policy tends to be much more distorted at higher values of the innate
cost. Examining the equation for agent rents in Equation (1), close to ecient eort can be
asked of types close to β, inducing marginal disutility of eort close to one, without granting
too large rents to the agent (even for the lowest type β). When innate costs are concentrated
at lower values, even if the agent chooses close to ecient eort with high probability, it can
be guaranteed that the agent's expected rents are not too large.
Another question related to the above discussion is whether any predictions on the mag-
nitude of the bound Ginf (R) can be made without any restrictions on the cost distributions
F . The answer is negative as the following example attests.





















; this can be taken arbitrarily large or
small with k.
The intuition for Example 1 is much the same as the one provided above in relation to
Corollary 5.1. When k is small, the cdf F is convex, and the distribution is concentrated on
high values of the innate cost. The principal's optimal policy then asks high eort for high
values of the innate cost, even if the surplus generated through eort is small. Conversely,
when k is large, the cdf F is concave, and the distribution is concentrated on low values of the
innate cost, so the reverse is true: the principal is unwilling to ask high eort for high values
of the innate cost, unless the surplus generated through eort is large.
As mentioned in the Introduction, empirical work on procurement often nds a skewed
distribution for rm costs, with many rms having similar cost performance but with a long
right tail of less ecient rms. Such an observation has been made by Wolak (1994) and
Brocas et al. (2006) for regulated water utilities, and in the context of Laont and Tirole's
model by Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) for urban transport and Abito (2019) for electric
utilities. A case that may be useful to consider for illustrative purposes is that with the log of
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Figure 3: Innate cost density based on estimate of Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002, Table 3)
Density of variable whose natural logarithm is distributed according to a Beta distribution
with parameters 0.59 and 2.15.
Figure 4: Ratio of gains to rents (Ginf (R) /R) against agent rents (R) for density of Figure 3
Calculated for innate cost whose natural logarithm is Beta distributed with parameters 0.59
and 2.15 (values of R shown below 0.75).
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innate cost distributed according to a Beta distribution, with parameters 0.59 and 2.15. This
is the distribution of the innate productivity parameter (related by scaling to the innate cost)
estimated by Gagnepain and Ivaldi for cost-plus contracts (see their Table 3). The density,
plotted in Figure 3, is sharply downward sloping, capturing the concentration of rms at a
baseline level of the innate cost. The ratio of worst-case gains to rents Ginf (R) /R is plotted
in Figure 4. This is a setting where the principal, under an optimal contract, can be sure to
extract a large fraction of the surplus generated through incentives. The ratio Ginf (R) /R is
below two for small values of agent rents R, but grows with the value of R.
6 Conclusions
This paper considered the problem of an analyst tasked with predicting equilibrium outcomes
of a principal-agent relationship, while possessing limited information about the environment.
In particular, we assumed that while the analyst has good grounds for determining the distri-
bution of (cost) performance absent incentives, she is ignorant of the feasible agent technologies
or preferences for responding to incentives. Given this lack of information, we made only weak
assumptions on agent preferences: monotonicity and convexity of the disutility of eort, as
well as separability from the innate cost. We then showed how to obtain sharp predictions
on the set of expected payos that can arise in equilibrium.
The analysis is informative regarding the relationship between agent and principal rents in
well-designed incentive contracts under restrictions on the environment that can be guided by
theory (rather than resulting from, say, ad hoc functional form assumptions on the technology
or agent preferences). The ndings could perhaps be helpful in further clarifying and rening
a message on which economists seem to agree: in many agency relationships, the presence of
asymmetric information implies agent rents are in expectation strictly positive, and sometimes
sizeable, even if incentive contracts are well designed. Large agent rents need not be indicative
of incentive contracts performing poorly: we uncovered a tight positive relationship between
the expected payo of the agent and the expected gains to the principal in optimal incentive
contracts.
In addition, the paper has developed a novel approach to determining the relationship
between principal and agent rents, which seems likely to be useful in other settings. Most
immediately, the Laont-Tirole model has been applied in settings of executive compensation
in Edmans and Gabaix (2011), Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik and Sannikov (2012), Garrett and
Pavan (2012, 2015), and Carroll and Meng (2016). Given the proximity of these models to
the procurement model that we studied here, our results can be mapped almost directly.
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The approach in this paper can therefore provide informative predictions on welfare, say in a
setting where managerial incentives are to be newly introduced (for instance, in the context
of a state-owned enterprise which had previously been run by bureaucrats in the absence of
direct nancial incentives). Other settings where the results above might perhaps be readily
adapted include auctions for incentive contracts (as in Laont and Tirole, 1987) and dynamic
incentive contracts with stocastically evolving types (as in Garrett and Pavan mentioned
above). More speculatively, there may exist ways to adapt the ideas of the paper to other
settings with adverse selection generally, such as second-degree price discrimination models
in the style of Mussa and Rosen (1978). For instance, consider a rm that has practiced
linear pricing of quantity with a xed price per quantity, generating historical quantity data.
What predictions can be made regarding welfare if the rm, while still facing one-dimensional
asymmetric information, departs from linear pricing to choose an optimal non-linear schedule?
Note that a reasonably successful application of our ideas might involve only nding bounds
that are not tight (or cannot be shown to be tight). In other words, it could be that only the
part of the methodology related to Proposition 4.1 can be mimicked in some contexts.
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A Appendix: Proofs of all results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1.
We begin by nding a lower bound on the principal's expected payo in a mechanism with
the production cost target given by C (·).




→ R prescribing production costs to
each innate cost β. A lower bound on the principal's expected total payment in an incentive-






















where e (β) = β − C (β) for all β, and where V G is given by (4).
Proof. Let the agent of type β have payo, when producing at realized cost C, equal to
v (C, β) = −ψ (β − C) plus the transfer received from the principal. Here, we can view the
cost target C as drawn from a set C = R (the allocation set in the language of Carbajal and
Ely, 2013). We seek to apply Theorem 1 of Carbajal and Ely to this setting.
Note that, because ψ is assumed Lipschitz continuous, ψ (β − C) is equi-Lipschitz contin-
uous in β across C ∈ C, with the Lipschitz constant the same as for ψ. This ensures the
satisfaction of Assumption A3 of Carbajal and Ely. Note that satisfaction of their Conditions
A1-A2 is immediate.15
Dene, for each β ∈ [β, β̄] and each C ∈ C,
d̄v (C, β) ≡ lim inf
r↘0
[










dv (C, β) ≡ lim sup
r↗0
[






−ψ (β + r − C) + ψ (β − C)
r
]
where the equalities follow from convexity of ψ. Hence, given −ψ is concave, functions
d̄v (C, β) and dv (C, β) are superderivatives of −ψ (·), evaluated at β − C. As a result, the
15For A1, we can pair C with the Borel sigma algebra on R, since feasible production cost assignments are






correspondence S : [β, β̄] ⇒ R given by
S (β) ≡
{
r ∈ R : d̄v (C (β) , β) ≤ r ≤ dv (C (β) , β)
}
,
is nonempty. S (β) is single-valued in case the above limits are equal at (C (β) , β), and a
closed interval of positive length otherwise. By convexity of ψ, d̄v (−C, β) and dv (−C, β)
are non-increasing in (C, β); hence d̄v and dv are measurable functions, while C (·) is assumed
measurable. Hence, d̄v (C (·) , ·) and dv (C (·) , ·) are measurable, verifying Ely and Carbajal's
Assumption M. Note also that, by the above denitions, d̄v (C (β) , β) and dv (C (β) , β)
depend only on e (β) = β − C (β) (and not β and C (β) individually).
Now, recall that the payment rule can be chosen to ensure the agent always nds it




for any report β̂. If the direct mechanism imple-
menting production cost rule C (·) is incentive compatible, the agent's payo can be denoted












. Since A1-A3 and M
of Carbajal and Ely are satised, Theorem 1 of their paper applies. Hence, for any β ∈ [β, β̄],








for some measurable selection s of S.
A lower bound on agent rents in an incentive-compatible and individually-rational mecha-
nism is provided by taking s (β) = − [∂−ψ] (e (β)) for all β (i.e., equal to the upper bound for








≥ 0). In order for an
agent of type β to earn rents
∫ β̄
β
[∂−ψ] (e (x)) dx when truth-telling in the direct mechanism,
it must be that y (β) = ψ (e (β)) +
∫ β̄
β






















We now characterize eort policies that minimize the lower bound. Such policies maximize
pointwise the virtual gains V G (e, β) by choice of e ∈ R for almost every β; in what follows, we
omit the qualication that statements hold only for sets of innate costs β that have probability
one, simply considering eort policies that maximize V G (e, β) for every value of β.





u > 0 such that V G (e, β) < 0 for all e < 0 and all e > u. Note that, because ψ is convex,
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the left derivative of ψ, i.e. ∂−ψ, is left-continuous and non-decreasing. Hence V G (·, β) is
upper semi-continuous for all β. This means that the maximizers E∗ (β) ≡ arg max [V G (e, β)]
are non-empty and closed for each β. Since F (β) /f (β) is increasing, standard monotone
comparative statics arguments (see Topkis, 1978) imply that E∗ (β) is non-increasing in the
strong set order. We can then consider monotone (non-increasing) selections, denoted e∗ (β),
of the correspondence E∗ (for instance, one can take maxE∗ (β) or minE∗ (β)).
We now show that eort policies which are monotone selections from E∗ can be imple-
mented as part of an incentive-compatible and individually-rational mechanism, with the
principal's expected payment equal to the lower bound in Lemma A.1. For a monotone
selection e∗ (·), the cost target is given by C∗ (β) = β − e∗ (β) for each β (hence C∗ (·) is non-
decreasing). Let then the payments to the agent when the cost target is met (in addition to





Take payments when the agent fails to meet the cost target to be small enough that this is





be the payo obtained by type β when reporting β̂ and choosing eort















= U (β, β) +
∫ β
β̂
























− [∂−ψ] (x− C (x))
)
dx
≤ U (β, β) .
The third equality follows using that a convex function is dierentiable except for at most
countably many points (i.e., ∂−ψ = ψ
′, except at these points). The inequality follows because





for any report β̂, the inequality implies incentive compatibility, as desired.
Hence, the eort policy e∗ is implementable in an incentive-compatible mechanism where the
principal's expected payment is given in Lemma A.1, as we wanted to show.
We now prove a result that establishes the nal claim in the proposition.
Lemma A.2. Let e∗ (·) be any measurable selection from E∗. For all β > β, the left derivative
of disutility at equilibrium eort, [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β)), must be strictly less than one.



























































is the minimum of the
ecient eort choices.
Now, xing β > β, we want to show that [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β)) < 1. Because F/f is as-
sumed strictly increasing, [∂−ψ] (e

















= 1. For this case, consider the eect on the virtual gain from incentives
























































































The equality follows because ψ is convex and hence dierentiable except at countably many
points. The inequality follows because ∂−ψ is non-decreasing. The right-hand side of the
inequality is strictly positive for ε suciently small, since F (β)
f(β)
is strictly positive. This shows




, and hence [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β)) < 1. Q.E.D.
We next determine further properties of optimal eort policies.
Lemma A.3. Optimal eort e∗ (·) is essentially unique and essentially non-increasing.
Proof of Lemma A.3. First, consider why any selection from optimal eort policies E∗
must be non-increasing (the argument is closely related to the one in Topkis, 1978, Theorem
6.3). Consider for a contradiction an eort policy e∗ that maximizes virtual gains, but for
which there are β′, β′′ ∈ [β, β̄] with β′ < β′′ and e∗ (β′) < e∗ (β′′). From the previous lemma,
[∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β′′)) < 1, and hence, since ψ is convex, we conclude that e∗ (β′′) − ψ (e∗ (β′′)) >
e∗ (β′) − ψ (e∗ (β′)). Hence, if [∂−ψ] (e∗ (β′′)) = [∂−ψ] (e∗ (β′)), e∗ (β′) does not maximize the
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virtual gains V G (e, β′). Suppose then that [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β′′)) > [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (β′)), and note



























which contradicts e∗ (β′′) maximizing the virtual gains V G (e, β′′). We conclude that e∗ (β′′) ≤
e∗ (β′).
We thus showed, in the language of Topkis (1978), that the set of maximizers E∗ (β) is
strongly descending (β′′ > β′ implies e∗ (β′′) ≤ e∗ (β′)). Every E∗ (β) that is not a singleton
corresponds to an open interval, say (e′ (β) , e′′ (β)) for e′ (β) , e′′ (β) ∈ E∗ (β). That E∗ (β) is
strongly descending implies that the collection of such intervals,
{





is disjoint. Hence, essential uniqueness of optimal eort follows because there can be at most
countably many disjoint open intervals in R. Q.E.D.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3.1.
A.2 Proof of results in Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: {P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ} =co
{




. We rst show that {P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ}
is equal to the convex hull of
{




, as claimed in the main text. Note that,
by Carathéodory's Theorem, any point in the convex hull of
{





R2) can be written as the convex combination of points P (γx) for at most three values of x.
By linearity of P , and because any convex combination of step functions γx is in Γ, this point
must reside in {P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ}; i.e.,
co
{




⊆ {P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ}.
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with γk being right-continuous step functions and hence convex combinations of the step




















→ P (γ) as k → ∞. Since the
convex hull of a compact set in R2 is itself compact, the convex hull of
{





compact. It therefore contains P (γ). This establishes {P (γ) : γ ∈ Γ} ⊆ co
{





which implies the result.
Step 2: L∗ strictly increasing and convex. That L∗ is strictly increasing and convex




, is a point on the lower
boundary of the convex hull co
{





Step 3: Form of a solution. The fact that there is a solution γ∗ described by the cut-
os βl and βu follows because points on the lower boundary of co
{





be written as convex combinations of P (γx) for at most two values of x. This follows again by
Carathéodory's Theorem. Consider the tangent line to the convex hull passing through the
point (R,L∗ (R)). This point belongs to the intersection of co
{





aforementioned tangent line; a set with dimension 1. Hence, by Carathéodory's Theorem, it
can be written as the convex combination of at most two points in the set. The claim in the
proposition then follows, since there is then a solution to Problem I which can be written as
a convex combination of the step functions γx for two values of x.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4.1. Q.E.D.




= 0, the expected gains from
incentives is equal to
∫ β̄
β
F (s)h (s) [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (s)) ds, where e∗ is an optimal eort policy. Given
F , consider a solution to Problem I, γ∗, that can be described by cut-os βl and βu as
introduced in Proposition 4.1. We aim at selecting a sequence of disutility functions in Ψ such
that the left derivative of the agent's marginal disutility of eort in equilibrium, [∂−ψ] (e
∗ (·)),




is equal to zero.
While the case where β = βl < βu is considered in the main text, there are two remaining
cases: the rst where β < βl = βu ≡ β∗, and the second where β < βl < βu.
First case. Suppose there is a solution to Problem I with β < βl = βu ≡ β∗. We consider
a sequence of disutility functions (ψn)
∞
n=1. Under an optimal mechanism for the n
th disutility
function of the sequence, the agent will exert positive eort for any innate cost below some
threshold βn, but zero eort for any higher innate cost. When positive eort is chosen, the left




































The latter is used to dene disutility functions
ψn (e) ≡









bn + 2 (e− bn) if e > bn
for each positive integer n. For each n, ψn belongs to Ψ, and an optimal mechanism features
eort bn for innate costs below the threshold βn; eort for innate costs above βn is zero. We




F (s)h (s) γ∗ (s) ds = L∗ (R)
as n→ +∞.
Second case. Suppose there is a solution to Problem I with β < βl < βu. Hence, there
is an interval on which γ∗ (β) = 1, an interval on which γ∗ (β) = γmid for γmid ∈ (0, 1), and
possibly an interval on which γ∗ (β) = 0.
Let a = F (βu)
f(βu)
γmid


























We can consider η to be small enough that (bn)
∞
n=1 takes values strictly greater than a for
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every n.
Dene a sequence of disutility functions in Ψ as follows: for each n = 1, 2, . . . ,
ψn (e) ≡

0 if e ≤ 0












(bn − a) + 2 (e− bn) if e ∈ (bn,∞)
.
Consider now eort levels that maximize the virtual gains V Gn (e, β) ≡ e−ψn (e)−F (β)f(β) [∂−ψn] (e).
For each n, these satisfy e∗n (β) ∈ {0, a, bn}. The virtual gains for these levels of eort are,
respectively, zero,
















We have that both e∗n (β) = 0 and e
∗
n (β) = a are optimal in case β = βu , and both e
∗
n (β) = a
and e∗n (β) = bn are optimal in case β = βn (these observations follow by choice of a and
bn). Thus, given disutility ψn, the principal chooses eort e
∗
n (β) = 0 in case β > βu, eort
e∗n (β) = a in case β ∈ (βn, βu), and eort e∗n (β) = bn in case β < βn. Note then that expected
agent rents are∫ β̄
β
F (s) [∂−ψn] (e
∗



































The third equality holds by choice of βn, while the nal equality holds as a property of the
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solution to Problem I, γ∗. The principal's expected payo is∫ β̄
β
F (s)h (s) [∂−ψn] (e
∗
n (s)) ds
which approaches L∗ (R) =
∫ β̄
β
F (s)h (s) γ∗ (s) ds as n → +∞. This convergence follows





Proof of Corollary 4.1. The result is a consequence of the following observation.
Consider any disutility function ψ ∈ Ψ, with the right derivative at zero strictly positive
(recall that the proof of Proposition 4.2 considered only such functions, in order to approach
the boundary of U). Let a, ε > 0, with ε less than the aforementioned right derivative. Then
consider the disutility function ψ̄ (e; a, ε) as dened in Equation (6). Given this disutility
function, the principal's virtual gains for innate cost β are: zero for eort zero;
a (1− ε)− F (β)
f (β)
ε
for eort a; and
e− εa− ψ (e− a)− F (β)
f (β)
[∂−ψ] (e− a)
for eort e > a. Note that the latter can be written as




for e′ = e−a > 0. Holding a xed, provided ε is small enough, optimal eort for the disutility
ψ̄ (e; a, ε) is at least a for all β. Also, if the agent with innate cost β takes eort ě > 0
in the optimal policy for disutility function ψ, he takes eort ě + a in the optimal policy
for ψ̄ (·; a, ε), and hence the (left) marginal disutility of eort is unchanged (i.e., [∂−ψ] (ě) =[
∂−ψ̄ (·; a, ε)
]
(ě+ a)). The (left) marginal disutility of eort for disutility function ψ̄ (e; a, ε)
is ε whenever the agent takes eort a. Also, the measure of β for which the agent takes eort
greater than a for ψ̄ (·; a, ε) but zero under ψ (·) vanishes as ε → 0. Therefore, the expected
gains from incentives under ψ̄ (·; a, ε) are larger by an amount that approaches a from below
as ε is taken to zero. The agent's expected rents are either the same as under ψ (for instance,
if the agent takes positive eort with probability one under ψ), or approach the value under
ψ from above as ε→ 0. Q.E.D.
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A.3 Proof of the result in Section 5
















. Therefore the result follows if we can show
∫ β̄
β
F (β)h (β) dβ −
∫ β̄
β
F (β) dβ ≤ 0,
and if we can show the inequality is strict when F (β)
f(β)








Integrating by parts, we nd∫ β̄
β





) − ∫ β̄
β
F (β) dβ.
Hence, we have∫ β̄
β






















































are functions taking the same value at β and β̄,
while F (β)
f(β)




on (β, β̄), and the inequality is strict in case
F (β)
f(β)
is strictly concave. Part 1 of the corollary therefore follows.
Now consider Part 2, and hence suppose F (β)
f(β)







β ∈ (β, β̄]. For a given value R ∈ (0, R̄), there is a solution γ∗ to Problem I such that γ∗ (β) = 1
for β < β∗ and γ∗ (β) = 0 for β > β∗. Then, note that the conditional distribution dened












. Hence, considering the expression in Equation (9) evaluated for the
distribution F̄ , with upper limit of the support β∗, we have∫ β∗
β
F (β)h (β) dβ −
∫ β∗
β
F (β) dβ ≥ 0,
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with strict inequality when either F (β)
f(β)
is strictly convex, or EF̄
[
β̃
]
<
β+β∗
2
. This establishes
the result. Q.E.D.
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